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Exempt Entities as Government Contractors: Regulation Through Cooperative
Federalism
Frances R. Hill
The role of exempt entities as government contractors highlights the complexity of exempt
entities’ relationships with numerous government regulatory agencies administering diverse
bodies of law at both the federal and state levels. Exempt entities’ roles as government
contractors can be neither understood nor regulated solely, or even primarily, in terms of their
tax status. Activities undertaken as government contractors and the way those activities are
pursued may be consistent or inconsistent with federal and/or state requirements for exemption
from taxation. But, compliance with tax law requirements does not establish compliance with
other bodies of law or establish that the entity can provide the expertise required to implement
government programs or that its actual operations are consistent with its contractual
obligations. A regulatory framework for exempt entities that contract with federal and/or state
governments must take account of both contract performance in substantive terms and
continuing qualification for exemption from federal and state taxation.
Government contracting means that government programs financed by taxpayer money
are implemented by entities that are not themselves government agencies. The emergence of
what some analysts have called “government by contract” raises difficult and important issues
of accountability.1 Accountability requires monitoring of contractors to prevent fraud and abuse
and to ensure that government programs are being implemented as intended in the interests of
the beneficiaries. These issues are best understood as applying to all government contractors,
without regard to their tax status. At the same time, in part because there has been little
attention to issues of accountability in the case of exempt entity contractors and in part because
it is sometimes suggested that problems of accountability would be less pressing if exempt
entities played broader roles in the “contracting state,” directing some attention to issues of
accountability and monitoring in the case of exempt entities as government contractors could
advance the understanding of both tax exemption and government contracting.
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Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FL. S. L. Rev. 155 (2000). See also, JODY FREEMAN AND MARTHA
MINOW, GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Harvard University Press,
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This paper focuses on three issues of accountability and monitoring applied to exempt
entity contractors. The first issue is what questions should be the focal points of monitoring and
accountability. The second issue is which agency or agencies might most effectively monitor
exempt entities in their roles as government contractors. The third issue is whether exemption is
a proxy for a well-designed system of accountability monitoring.
This paper suggests that the focal points of monitoring and accountability should be (i)
prevention of fraud and abuse and (ii) ensuring that government programs are implemented in a
manner that achieves the purposes of the programs being implemented. With respect to the
second issue, this paper takes the position that agencies with responsibility for implementing the
substantive programs covered by the contract should generally play the leading roles in ensuring
that taxpayers’ money is used effectively to implement government programs. These agencies
have the relevant expertise with both the core requirements and the various modifications that
such agencies may have negotiated in particular cases. Effective monitoring of government
contractors is inescapably grounded in expertise in the programs being implemented. The third
issues arises in the form of claims that exempt entities do not require monitoring beyond the
scrutiny associated with maintaining their tax exempt status. The weak form of this claim is that
the IRS can provide adequate monitoring through its determination that the contractor continues
to qualify for exempt status. The strong form of this claim is that exempt entities can effectively
monitor themselves because they are defined by their mission. This paper expresses
considerable reservations about the idea that tax exempt status can serve as an effective proxy
for a monitoring with respect to either fraud and abuse or program implementation.
The paper begins with a discussion of exempt entities as government contractors. Part II
discusses the concept of cooperative federalism as it relates to the implementation of government
programs. Part III looks at issues of accountability and monitoring in two patterns of
government contracting with exempt entities, the charity carveout pattern that reserves certain
contracting opportunities to exempt entities and the conduit pattern in which a nonprofit, in
some cases one that benefitted from a charity carveout, subcontracts with a taxable entity. Part
IV provides a brief conclusion that highlights issues to consider based on analyzing exempt
entities as government contractors in a system of cooperative federalism.

I.

EXEMPT ENTITIES AS GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS

This paper does not claim to present a comprehensive account of exempt entities as
government contractors. This is an area in which practice has developed far more fully than has
either description or theory. Nevertheless, important studies dating back to the Reagan years
provide an important foundation for any work that is done moving forward. Studies by
Abramson and Salamon2 and more recently by Elizabeth Boris and her colleagues3 have
2

ALAN J. ABRAMSON & LESTER M. SALAMON, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND THE NEW FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
(Urban Institute Press, 1986).
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Elizabeth T. Boris, Erwin de Leon, Katie L. Roeger, Milena Nikolova, Human Service Nonprofits and Government
Collaboration: Findings from the 2010 National Survey of Nonprofit Government Contracting and Grants (Urban
Institute 2010)[the “2010 Urban Institute Study”]. See also a companion report by the National Council of
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established the importance of government contracting to both exempt entities and to the federal
government. Steven Rathgeb Smith and Michael Lipsky have established a foundation for future
work on the impact of government contracting on the structure and operations of exempt
entities.4 The 2010 Urban Institute Study5 and a report by a task force of distinguished New
York lawyers and organization leaders working collaboratively with New York Attorney General
Eric Schneiderman6 have highlighted important problems arising from failures of both federal
and state government agencies to fulfill their obligations under their contracts with exempt
entities. Contracts are not signed and payments are not made in a timely manner, leaving exempt
entities to finance government programs through what amounts to interest-free loans to
government agencies.7 The fact that this paper does not focus on this range of failures by
governments to fulfill their contractual obligations should not be construed as minimizing the
importance of these issues.
The 2010 Urban Institute Study focused on exempt entities that contract to implement
human services programs, the area of government policy which has seen the greatest
concentration of exempt entity contractors. The Study found that exempt entity contractors tend
to be large and to hold multiple contracts. The Study has also documented a pattern of financial
dependence of exempt entity contractors on government funding, although some exempt entity
government contractors also engage in successfully in fund raising from private sources.
Overall, the 2010 Urban Institute Study provides strong evidence that exempt entities are
actively involved in extensive government contracting.
This article suggests that questions relating to exempt entities’ performance as
government contractors are important as well. In the Introduction, this paper identified and
briefly discussed three issues raised by concerns over monitoring for accountability.8 The first
issue was the focal point of monitoring and accountability. As suggested in the Introduction,
monitoring for fraud and abuse will always be necessary. Monitoring for fraud and abuse has
been the central focus of most monitoring of most government contracts.9 It has also been the
Nonprofits, Cost, Complexification, and Crisis: Government’s Human Services Contracting “System” Hurts
Everyone (2010).
4

STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH AND MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF
CONTRACTING (Harvard University Press, 1993).
5

Boris et al, supra note 3.
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Leadership Committee for Nonprofit Revitalization, Revitalizing Nonprofits, Renewing New York: Report to
Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman (Feb. 16, 2012). Contracting issues are discussed at 10-17. This Report
also focuses on governance issues, including recommendations for strengthening the capacity of boards to play
strong, active, constructive roles in organization governance. See id. at 23-33.
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Small businesses, which are most commonly subcontractors under contracts in which large taxable entities are the
prime contractor, express many of the same concerns. See 76 Fed. Reg. 61626-61632 (October 5, 2011)(discussion
of rules requiring that prime contractors include small businesses as a target percentage of their subcontractors).
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For a thoughtful discussion of the complexity of the concept of accountability, see Kevin P. Kearns, Accountability
in the Nonprofit Sector, in LESTER M. SALAMON, ED., THE STATE OF NONPROFIT AMERICA 587-615 (Brookings
Institution Press, 2012, 2d ed.)(discussing performance accountability at 596-601).
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OMB Circular A-122, Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations, 70 Fed. Reg. 51927-43 (Aug. 31, 2005).
Circular A-122 provides that “[s]ome non-profit organizations, because of their size and nature of operations, can be
considered to be similar to commercial concerns for purpose of applicability of cost principles. Such non-profit
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focus of IRS audits of exempt entities.10 This is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Exempt
organizations that contract with federal or state or local governments require monitoring to
establish their record of program performance. Both the taxpayer funded contracts and the
taxpayer funded exemption from taxation can be defended only if and to the extent that exempt
entities perform their contract obligations. The same is true with respect to program
performance monitoring and accountability with respect to taxable entities that are government
contractors.
Program performance monitoring, not just monitoring to prevent fraud and abuse, is
important because exempt entities perform so many contracts in human services areas and, as a
result, so often work with vulnerable people. The care of vulnerable people imposes a moral
responsibility on both the governments responsible for the programs and on the contractors who
assist in implementing the programs because vulnerable people cannot protect themselves from
abuse by those who are being paid with taxpayers’ money to care for them. This is a solemn
responsibility performed under difficult conditions. Stories of abuse are told repeatedly but seem
to have little impact. Abuse of vulnerable persons may or may not correlate with evidence that
the contractor engages in financial misdeeds as well. The two elements of monitoring are
directed to different types of problems. Both are necessary.
The second issue is what agencies should play the leading roles in monitoring the
performance of government contractors. This paper takes the position that the agencies that
administer the programs, not the IRS, should take the lead. This paper suggests that the IRS is
not the proper agency to engage in monitoring for contract performance. The case for making
contract performance monitoring a responsibility of the IRS would be based on the argument that
contract performance is part of the determination of whether the organizations is operating for an
exempt purpose. But, the organization might well be doing something that could be consistent
with its exempt purpose without fulfilling the requirements of the particular contract that
provided funding for the activity. An exempt entity’s mission is not necessarily coterminous
with its contract obligations. The difference arises not because the organization is engaged in
activities that are inconsistent with its exempt status but because its activities may not be
consistent with its contractual obligations to implement a government program. As the
discussion in Part III of cooperative federalism indicates, federal programs are administered
throughout a complex array of federal-state-local relationships that quite commonly involve
programs modifications. Contracts with particular contractors may incorporate additional
program modifications, but it is not possible to say much about these without access to the
contracts through which various programs are implemented. Performance monitoring is difficult
even without these variations.
The third issue is whether exempt status could serve as a proxy for program performance
monitoring. This paper suggests that the idea that exempt entities are less likely to engage in
organization shall operate under Federal cost principles applicable to commercial concerns.”
Appendix C to Circular A-122 provides of list of these organizations. Id. at 31943.
10

Id. at 31928.

The IRS has devoted significant resources to implementing section 4958 dealing with excess benefit transactions
and its relationship with the concepts of private benefit and inurement. At times, it seems that attention to whether
exempt entities are operating for an exempt purpose through activities consistent with that purpose receives less
administrative attention to the cluster of private benefit doctrines.
4

activities that fall into the general category of fraud and abuse and more likely to excel in terms
of program implementation is an assumption without any empirical basis. Assumptions, often
unarticulated and inchoate, that exempt entities provide greater skills and insight while requiring
a lesser degree of monitoring with respect to either fraud and abuse or program performance,
seem to be part of the rationale for special preferences for exempt entities in government
contracting. No one has developed a plausible argument for this approach, much less provided
evidence supporting it. Based on what is now known, exempt status does not mean that
monitoring is unnecessary. This claim could not be supported even if the organization’s mission
aligned closely with the functions it would perform under the government contract. Conflating
the contract with assumptions about an organization’s mission and its track record in pursuing
that mission effectively are matters for research, not a premise for defining contract terms. To
date, little such research has been done, in part because government programs are complex and
because data about implementation are not available.
Among the questions that remain unaddressed is whether exempt entities that are
performing government contracts in fact have relevant prior experience in providing services in
the same or similar areas. While it is common to note that many of the areas now financed
through government programs were once provided by exempt entities, these social histories say
nothing about whether contemporary exempt entities that provide services under government
contracts have any relevant experience. These social histories also gloss over the differences
between private charity and government programs. One relevant distinction is the relationship to
beneficiaries. At least in an earlier era, charities could and did choose their beneficiaries.
Government programs began with a very different premise that treated beneficiaries as citizens
entitled to equal treatment if they qualified for participation in a government program.11 The
change from government funding of entities that implement programs to funding of the
beneficiaries in the form of vouchers has also brought marked changes from the historical
premise that a charity chooses its beneficiaries.12 These differences are not simply a matter of
who participates in programs and on what terms. They are also a matter of how programs are
designed and implemented.
There is little information on what operational capabilities might be characteristic of
exempt entities that seek government contracts and what characteristics might be correlated with
successful contract performance. For example, do exempt contractors with a previous track
record in privately funded efforts have a better record of successfully implementing government
contracts in the same policy areas? Or, does experience with the various systems of government
contracting play a more important role?13 Does implementation improve over time? What
11

Karen M. Tani, Welfare & Rights: Before the Movement: Rights as a Language of the State, 122 YALE L.J.
314)(2012)(detailing the use of the language of rights by the federal government during the New Deal to address
issues of federalism and administrative capacity as public support programs shifted from a framework of local “poor
laws” to a framework of federal and state programs).
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For a useful overview, see Kirsten A. Gronbjerg & Lester M. Salamon, Devolution, Marketization, and the
Changing Shape of Government-Nonprofit Relations, in LESTER M. SALAMON, ED., THE STATE OF NONPROFIT
AMERICA 549-86 (Brookings Institution Press, 2012, 2d ed.).
13

The complexity of government contracting requirements reflects statutory requirements and administrative
requirements relating to matters of both substance and procedures. Identifying these requirements is one of the main
challenges of designing better systems for government contract implementation.
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metrics are most useful in understanding contractor performance? Is it possible to determine
whether the operational characteristics of the contracting exempt entity or the characteristics of
the government system of contracting are more important in shaping contract outcomes?
Understanding these issues depends upon understanding what exempt entities are
contracting to do. Understanding what exempt entities are contracting to do requires analysis of
contracts that exempt entities sign. Issues of the program content, the procedural requirements,
the beneficiaries intended to be served are all matters that should be specified in the contract.
This information is essential for understanding if the claims of exempt entities to special
expertise are warranted and for thinking about reasonable performance metrics. Indeed, even the
contracts themselves are not readily available, and research based on reading the contracts has
not yet found its way into much of the literature on government programs and government
contracting.
These questions relating to what exempt entities have contracted to do are not answerable
with current data. Data on government contracts are fragmented, dispersed, and incomplete.
Both the government data base, USAspending (www.usaspending.gov) and the Pew Charitable
Trusts database, Subsidyscope (www.subsidyscope.org) do not yet provide confidence that it is
possible to look at the broad scope of government contracts or the broad range of exempt entities
that may be engaged in government contracting. It is heartening to learn that New York City has
launched a new website, www.CheckbookNYC.com, much greater access to relevant
information regarding city contracts.14 The site is intended to provide information to public
officials, who no longer have to request information from the Mayor’s office, as well as to the
public, including watchdog organizations. The source code of this site, developed using opensource software, will be made public for use by other governments.15 The Aspen Institute
recently unveiled a study on the future of “big data” on exempt entities that will permit the kinds
of research that are still out of reach do to the time and costs involved.16
Better data available in more usable formats will not solve all of the issues involved in
monitoring and accountability. Exempt entities at times find performance monitoring and
accountability inconsistent with their own sense of their missions. Exempt entity contractors
may view funding through a government contract as indistinguishable from funding through
private contributions.
This is not likely to be an analytically useful approach. It risks neglecting issues of
accountability and program performance monitoring that should be central in any system based
14

David M. Halbfinger, New Site Makes It Easier to View City Spending, The New York Times, Jan. 22, 2013. The
Report to the New York Attorney General, supra note 6 had recommended this kind of web site for the state of New
York, but it did not discuss public access.
15

David M. Halbfinger, New Site Makes It Easier to View City Spending, The New York Times, Jan. 22, 2013.
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Beth Simone Noveck and Daniel L. Goroff, Information for Impact: Liberating Nonprofit Sector Data (The Aspen
Institute, 2013). The study was discussed at a conference entitled Liberating 990 Data: How “Big Data” on the
Nonprofit Sector Can Spur Innovation, Knowledge and Accountability, held at the Aspen Institute in Washington,
D.C. on January 31, 2013 and available on the Aspen Institute web site. This program included remarks by Jonathan
Greenblatt, Special Assistant to the President and Director on the Office of Social Innovation and Civic Participation
in the Domestic Policy Council.
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on the use of taxpayer money. It is perhaps worth remembering that Hansmann’s work is based
on the importance of assuring donors that their contributions will be used for the intended
purposes, not to enrich organization managers or other insiders.17 This theory has led to a focus
on preventing private benefit, which has been an important development, but it has led some to
conflate preventing fraud and abuse with implementing the organization’s mission. The same
risk is present in considering the roles of exempt entities as government contractors.
These issues may soon become quite prominent among exempt organizations managers,
advisers, and the government officials charged with implementing government programs. On
January 11, 2013, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari filed by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) in USAID v. Alliance for Open Society.18 The
Court stated the question presented in the following terms: “Whether the United States
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, 22 U.S.C. 763(f), which
requires an organization to have a policy explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking in
order to receive federal funding to provide HIV and AIDS programs overseas, violates the First
Amendment.”19 This case, in effect, raises issues of whether a government contract is a grant to
an organization to pursue its own priorities or a contract with a government agency to implement
a government program. This case does not raise federalism issues, which make questions of
monitoring and accountability even more complex.

II.

COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM

Any reference to federalism is likely to evoke strong reactions because federalism is both
a structural principle of our constitutional system and a political ideology invoked for partisan
advantage. The operational consequence is that federalism is invoked to limit the federal
government while serving as the framework for implementing government programs. The
concept of federalism as a check on federal government authority is more fully developed than is
the concept of federalism as a framework for implementing government programs effectively.
Making government programs work involves “cooperative federalism,” which is, of course, not
always cooperative.20
Cooperative federalism is an operational reality without a well-developed legal
framework.21 Cooperative federalism relates primarily to program implementation. This means
17

Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L. J. 835 (1980); Henry B. Hansmann, The
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations from the Corporate Income Tax, 91 YALE L. J. 54 (1981).
18

USAID v. Alliance for Open Society, No. 12-10 cert. granted 1/11/2013.

19

The case below is Alliance for Open Society Int’l. v. USAID, 651 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’g 570 F. Supp. 2d
533 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). For a discussion of this case in the context of Spending Clause jurisprudence and the state
action doctrine, see Frances R. Hill, Speaking Truth to the Power that Funds Them: A Jurisprudence of Association
for Advocacy Organizations Financially Dependent on Government Grants and Contracts, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis.&
Pub. Pol. 363 (2012).
20

Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2008-2009).
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For a contemporary approach to exploring the relationships germane to cooperative federalism, see Abbe R.
Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health
Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534 (2011-12). For an analysis of the Roberts’ Courts uncertain jurisprudence
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that cooperative federalism implicates administrative agencies exercising their authority to
promulgate regulations and other guidance for program implementation. Cooperative federalism
also implicates the roles of agencies in monitoring the implementation of government programs
by government contractors. This is federalism at a granular level that takes account of
monitoring to enhance program performance as well as to prevent fraud and abuse.
The Supreme Court invocation of federalism as a limitation on federal government
authority has brought renewed interest in the structure of the administrative state and efforts to
understand the administrative state though analytical frameworks that incorporate federalism as
well as the roles of non-governmental actors.22 This has brought renewed attention to the
Spending Clause23 and to the conditions that may be imposed by the federal government that
finances state participation in government programs and also finances contracts with exempt
entities to implement these programs.
The Rehnquist Court, for all its concern with using federalism to limit federal
government authority, nevertheless decided the foundational case in modern Spending Clause
jurisprudence, South Dakota v. Dole, in a manner that gave the federal government broad latitude
in imposing conditions on states that received benefits and participated in the administration of
these programs.24 The Court in Dole gave the idea of “coercion” arising from the federal
government’s ability to deny participation to states that did not agree to certain conditions only
passing attention.25 The Roberts Court, in contrast, interpreted coercion far more centrally and
expansively in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) by defining
coercion to include state dependency on federal funding.26 To the Roberts Court federal funding
was a trap in the guise of a benefit.27
The Spending Clause is not the sole constitutional predicate applicable to cooperative
federalism. The Rehnquist Court took a far more restrictive approach to shared responsibility for
implementing federal government programs in two decisions in the 1990s dealing with what has
come to be called “commandeering.” These cases are expressly focused on the role of state
governments, concepts of state sovereignty, and the importance of limiting federal power. These
cases can be read through a variety of lenses. While they certainly address the structure of
in the area of cooperative federalism, see Robert J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism,
and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of StateGovernment Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61 DUKE L. J. 1599 (2011-2012).
22

Heather K. Gerken, Forward: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. Rev. 4 (2010-2011).

23

United States Constitution, Article I, § 8, cl.1.

24

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).

25

Id. at 211. The Court reasoned that “to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the
law into endless difficulties.” Id.
26

NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).

27

This interpretative twist allowed the Chief Justice to uphold the Affordable Care Act while claiming that he
limited the reach of federal funding and thus of federal authority. What this claim will mean for Spending Clause
jurisprudence going forward is one of the important questions emerging from NFIB v. Sebelius. For one view of the
importance of the case on this point, see Gillian F. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. Rev. 83
(2012).
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federalism, they also seem to promote an ideological agenda that is perhaps reconcilable with the
Constitution but is not compelled by the Constitution. In New York v. United States the Court
held that Congress could not require the states to enact or to implement federal government
programs.28 Congress had enacted a statute requiring each state to dispose of radioactive waste
generated in the state and setting forth both monetary incentives and sanctions to enforce
compliance by the states. The Court distinguished this case from cases subjecting states to
generally applicable law to which both the states and private parties are subject. The Court
stated that its decision focused solely on a statute that required a state government to implement
a federal government program. The Court found that permitting the federal government to
require the states to regulate undermined accountability by shifting the public perception of
which government was primarily responsible for the regulation.29
In a second case dealing with joint federal-state implementation of a federal government
statute, the Court prohibited what it called “commandeering” state employees to play a role in
implementing federal government programs. In Printz v. United States, the Court held that the
federal government lacked the authority to “command” state and local law enforcement officers
to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers.30
These two decisions by the Court suggest that federalism is based on clear distinctions
between the federal government and state governments, with each autonomous in its own
sphere.31 This concept of federalism may serve some purposes but it does not capture the
operational complexity of cooperative federalism. The question, which is largely beyond the
scope of this paper, is whether the theory of federalism based on dual sovereigns can be
reconciled with cooperative federalism or whether it imposes unworkable and ill-considered
limits on state officials when they are operating in a system of cooperative federalism.
Another constitutional predicate that shapes cooperative federalism is the Supremacy
Clause, 32 which permits the federal government to preempt state laws in particular cases The
Supreme Court has decided hundreds of preemption cases without developing a overarching or
synthesizing jurisprudence of preemption, although courts appear to support preemption in a
broad range of cases. For the purposes of this paper, it is important to note that preempting state
law is not the same thing as cooperating in implementing federal law in cases where state law
has been preempted. Waivers of the requirements of federal law can be understood in at least
28

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).

29

The Court elaborated on its reasoning in the following terms: “States are not mere political subdivisions of the
United States. State governments are neither regional offices nor administrative agencies of the Federal
Government....The Constitution permits both the Federal Government and the States to enact legislation regarding
the disposal of low level radioactive waste. The Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state
regulation contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold out incentives to the States as
a means of encouraging them to adopt suggested regulatory schemes. It does not, however, authorize Congress
simply to direct the States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive waste generated within their borders.”
30

Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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For critiques of the “autonomy” model of federalism, see Bulman-Pozen and Gerken, supra note 20 and Heather
K. Gerken, supra, note 22.
32

United States Constitution, Article VI, cl. 2.
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some instances as alternatives to complete preemption of state programs even when federal law
formally preempts state law. The relationship between preemption and cooperative federalism
remains to be explored.33
This paper focuses on cooperative federalism as a framework for implementing
government programs, including monitoring government contractors. This involves monitoring
to prevent fraud and abuse and monitoring to ensure that government programs are implemented
for the public benefit in a manner consistent with the choices made by government officials
charged with designing and implementing these programs. This is a process marked by
contingency and adaptation at many points. It is difficult, and perhaps unwise and unhelpful, to
generalize about the utility or disutility of the multiple processes of adaptation that characterize
the implementation of government programs. This paper presents instead an inventory of
patterns that define at least some of the settings in which cooperative federalism takes place.
This inventory does not pretend to constitute a model or a theory of cooperative federalism. It is
more like a checklist meant to stimulate discussion of where cooperative federalism in program
implementation takes place, how monitoring and accountability might develop in these settings,
and what limits to cooperative federalism might either undermine or promote program
effectiveness while safeguarding constitutional values. The patterns of cooperative federalism
include, but may not be limited to:
(1)
State programs implemented by state officials pursuant to state statutes
and regulations, funded by state revenue for the benefit of the people of the state
who are the intended beneficiaries of the program
(2)
Federal programs implemented by federal officials pursuant to federal
statutes and regulations, funded by federal revenue for the benefit of the people of
the United States who are the intended beneficiaries of the program
(3)
Federal programs implemented by federal and state officials pursuant to
federal statutes and regulations, which may include conditions imposed on states
that choose to participate in the programs, and including waivers obtained by
individual states, for the benefit of the people of the United States in light of
modifications applicable to the people of particular states that negotiated waivers
with federal agencies responsible for implementing the program.
(4)
Federal officials shaping or interdicting state implementation of state
programs based claims of conflicts with constitutional protections of
beneficiaries’ rights
(5)
Federal officials preempting state implementation and enforcement of
state programs based on federal claims of state interference with federal programs
under the preemption doctrine.
The first two patterns are consistent with the idea of the federal and state governments as
separate sovereigns, but this is an idea more attuned to ideological federalism than to the
33

For a brief but thought-provoking discussion, see Bulman-Pozen and Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, supra
note 20 at 1302-07.
10

granular federalism of program implementation. These two patterns are more usefully seen as
suggestions for research rather than as descriptions or conclusions. The third pattern is
consistent with the structure of many of the largest government programs, including the social
service programs in which exempt entities are most likely to become involved in program
implementation as government contractors. The fourth pattern raises the issue of what entities
protect beneficiaries in what circumstances. This issue is particularly important in human
services programs dealing with vulnerable populations but it extend to issues like the denial of
farm program benefits to African-American farmers by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.
This matter was addressed as a denial of constitutional guarantees of equal protection. One of
the issues arising in the contracting state is whether or in what circumstances contractors are
treated as state actors. In the same vein, contractors are often not subject to the same ethics rules
as those applicable to government employees. These issues deserve far more consideration than
they are being given here or than they have been given in most discussions of government
contracting. The fifth pattern addresses questions of which law applies when both the federal
government and one or more state governments have programs in place. The practice of granting
waivers to states and the pattern of negotiating contract-based modifications of government
programs with particular contractors makes the relationship between preemption and
implementation, monitoring, and accountability much more complex than may commonly be
appreciated.
This inventory of patterns of cooperative federalism raises questions about where exempt
entities in their roles as government contractors fit in a regulatory framework based on
cooperative federalism. Like cooperative federalism, this issue does not lend itself to certainty or
tidy charts purporting to account for all relevant dimensions of an issue. Whatever pattern of
cooperative federalism may apply to particular programs, state revenue departments and the IRS
as well as substantive agencies at both the federal and state levels are likely to be dealing with
each other.34 Government programs are implemented with considerable flexibility that results in
substantial modifications of programs. The scope and nature of such modifications and their
implications for government contracts for the provision of services has received little attention in
discussions of cooperative federalism or in discussions of exempt entities as government
contractors. The relationship between program modifications and contract modifications has not
been systematically explored.
This relationship raises questions about the terms of
accountability of both the contractor and the government and their shared responsibility to
ensuring that the benefits that are intended to result from the programs, and thus from the
contract, in fact are provided.

III.

CHARITY CARVEOUTS AND CONTRACTING CONDUITS: CAN COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM IMPROVE MONITORING, ACCOUNTABILITY AND CONTRACT
PERFORMANCE?

Exempt organizations’ experiences as government contractors direct attention to two
issues that have received little attention in the literature on government contracting. The first
34
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(2004).; Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. Rev. 2217 (2011).
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issue is described here as the issue of charity carveouts, a shorthand reference to a range of
contracting preferences and relaxation of statutory and/or regulatory requirements in the case of
exempt entities, particularly section 501(c)(3) public charities. The second issue is the role of
exempt entities as conduits or accommodations parties in the contracting process. A conduit or
accommodation party secures the contract but does not perform the work specified in the
contract, which is subcontracted to one or more taxable entities. Subcontracting can be a means
of enhancing contract performance.35 The issue here is how to reconcile subcontracting with
taxable entities with the claims made in support of charity carveouts. This issue relates directly
to the larger question of accountability in government contracting, accountability for the use of
taxpayer money to assist qualified participants in government programs. These questions have
been identified in the preceding sections of this article. They are considered here in light of
particular experiences based on publicly available information. This article makes no claims that
these discussions provide a complete description of the two experiences. It also makes no claim
that these two experiences described all, most, or even many government contracts involving
exempt entities. At the same time, there is no evidence to suggests that they are so atypical or
uncommon that they can be treated as irrelevant to understanding the requisites of a regulatory
regime for exempt entities’ contracting with federal and/or state governments.
A.

Charity Carveouts: Credit Counseling

Credit counseling organizations offer education regarding personal finances to people to
have encountered financial difficulties. The IRS has since 1969 taken the position that credit
counseling organizations that operate to educate the public can qualify for exemption as
organizations described in section 501(c)(3).36 Revenue Ruling 69-441 stated that the
organization would provide educational information to the public on “budgeting, buying
practices, and the sound use of consumer credit through the use of films, speakers, and
publications.”37 In addition, the organization would aid “low-income individuals and families
who have financial problems by providing them with individual counseling and, if necessary, by
establishing budget plans.”38 Under such budget plans, debtors would “voluntarily” make
payments to the section 501(c)(3) organization, which would keep the funds in a trust account
35
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and distribute them to creditors who had approved the payment plan. These payment services
were provided without charge to the debtor, and the full amount transferred by the debtor to the
organization would be credited against the amount that each debtor owed to the participating
creditor. The organization did not make loans to debtors or negotiate loans on behalf of debtors.
The organization was primarily funded by contributions from participating creditors, but
creditors could participate without making contributions to the organization. This ruling can be
read as both defining limits and suggesting planning opportunities for those intent on abusing
their exempt status.
In 1996 Congress enacted the Credit Organization Repair Act (CROA) to address serious
abuses by credit repair organizations.39 Among the most serious abuses targeted by CROA were
charging debtors seeking assistance mandatory fees or pressuring debtors to purchase debt
modifications plans. In addition, the organizations far too often failed to provide any meaningful
assistance to debtors whom they had promised to assistance and from whom they had collected
fees.
CROA defined credit repair organizations not to include “any nonprofit organization
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.”40
The result was a “charity carveout” from the requirements of the Act. This carveout in CROA is
consistent with the general jurisdictional principle in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which limits Federal Trade Commission (FTC) jurisdiction over nonprofits, certain banks,
insurance companies, and common carriers.41 These jurisdictional limits are based on the
activities undertaken and, exception in the case of nonprofits, not solely on tax status.
The terms of the carveout raised the question of whether it applied to any organization
that had a determination letter from the IRS recognizing it as exempt as an organization
described in section 501(c)(3) even if was not operating in a manner consistent with its exempt
status. The leading case addressing this issue is Zimmerman v. Cambridge Credit Counseling,,
in which the district court held that section 501(c)(3) status was sufficient to trigger the
careveout,42 but the First Circuit reversed on grounds that the language of the carveout required
that an entity subject to the carveout did not base nonprofit status solely on exemption as an
organization described in section 501(c))(3).43 While this case prevented abusive section
501(c)(3) organizations from relying on their exempt status as a defense against claims that they
had violated CROA and made it clear that courts could look at the actual operation of
organizations even if they had determination letters from the IRS recognizing their exempt
status, these cases left much of the responsibility with the IRS since organizations that were not
39
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recognized as section 501(c)(3) organizations had no claim that CROA did not apply to them.
The result was that credit counseling organizations continued to seek exemption, which made the
problem worse. The result was an effort by the FTC, the IRS, and state authorities to stop the
abuse of debtors by credit counseling organizations.
In simple numeric terms, the FTC brought twenty-three enforcement actions against debt
relief companies.44 The IRS has examine or sought information from almost 800 credit
counseling organizations.45 The IRS continues to deny exempt status to new organizations
proposing to operate as credit counseling organizations and to revoke the exempt status of
organizations that have been operating in a manner consistent with their exempt status.
This numerical comparison is not, of course, the whole story. The FTC promulgated
regulations relating to deceptive or abusive practices in the telemarketing of debt relief services
in its 2010 Telemarketing Sales Rule,46 which was promulgated under the Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act.47 In addition, the broader effort against deceptive
and abusive debt relief companies has depended critically on litigation by state officials pursuant
to a range of state statutes. The FTC lists 244 state enforcement actions and states that it is
aware of 10 others.48 In the Preamble to the Telemarketing Sales Rule, the FTC described these
state enforcement actions pursuant to state laws as “valuable” but also stated that “[t]he
Commission agrees with the commenters who noted the advantages of a federal standard that is
enforceable both by the FTC and the states, in particular the ability to obtain nationwide
injunctive relief and consumer redress.”49 The FTC also noted that Congress had preserved
some scope for federal preemption of state laws in this area.50
In 2006 Congress added section 501(q) to the Internal Revenue Code. 51 Section 501(q)
has been controversial, largely because of its reliance on governance mechanisms as an indicator
of charitable purposes and as a method of preventing private benefit. These governance
requirements are not unlike the reliance on the involvement of members of the community in
health care organization boards to establish the organization’s commitment to community
benefit. The larger question raised by section 501(q) is the efficacy of procedural requirements
for monitoring performance. Without data on outcomes for participants in the programs offered
by the credit counseling organizations, it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Yet, there is no
consensus on metrics for participant outcomes and on the cost of engaging in these kinds of
performance evaluations. This paper has suggested that exempt entities should not be immune
from accountability and monitoring and that the IRS is not the appropriate agency for such
44
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activities. Section 501(q) will be helpful for tax administration, but is unlikely to serve as an
alternative to performance accountability.
The charity carveout has created a predicate for abuse of consumers, many of whom are
people of limited means, by limiting the scope of FTC enforcement actions and imposing a
regulatory burden on the IRS. When Congress limited the authority of the FTC, it unintentionally
suggested an abusive planning tactic for bad actors seeking to profit from the economic troubles
of others. The IRS has spent untold hours of staff time revoking exempt status of credit
counseling organizations or denying applications for recognition of exemption as a organization
described in section 501(c)(3).52
B.

Contracting Conduits: New Jersey Halfway Houses

Subcontracting can enhance contract performance, but that outcome does not happen
without careful attention to the assumptions made and the kind of monitoring that may be the
most effective in various types of programs. The matter of the New Jersey halfway houses is a
case in point.53
For reasons best known to itself, the state of New Jersey requires that state contracts for
operating half-way houses be operated by section 501(c)(3) organizations. Operating a halfway
house requires skills that appear to be possessed by a very limited number of entities, all of
which are taxable. A taxable company that operates prisons and halfway houses in other states
created a section 501(c)(3) for the express purpose of winning the contract with the state of New
Jersey.54 The founders and officers of the charity were executives of the taxable company, and
the taxable company was the charity’s sole member. The charity contract with its taxable parent
and agreed to provide the entire amount received from the state to the taxable company, minus
generous compensation for the charity’s officers, all of whom were also officers of the taxable
parent.
The New Jersey halfway houses were models of how not to operate a halfway house.
Inmates came and went at will, and violent inmates terrorized those who were less violent. The
guards feared the violent inmates and were unable or unwilling to protect the other inmates. At
least one inmate was killed by other inmates. Inmates committed serious crimes while absent
from the halfway house. No training for a successful transition to life outside of prison was
provided.
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The taxable company faced serious financial problems. The charity had no resources
other than the amount from the contract with the state. There is no indication in the charity’s
annual information returns that it engaged in active oversight of any kind of the performance of
the taxable company with which it had subcontracted the work under the state contract. This is
scarcely surprising. It is unlikely that the charity officials would have monitored their own
performance in their capacities as executives of the subcontractor.
No agency of New Jersey government seems to have been able to monitor the
performance problems at the halfway houses despite the serious problems of public safety and
the safety inmates that characterized the daily operations. The company president was a political
supporter of the governor. The New Jersey tax authorities did not terminate the charity’s exempt
status under state law. The IRS has not terminated the charity’s exempt status under federal tax
law. This is surprising not only because of the facts in this matter but also because the IRS in
2012 issued a private letter ruling denying exempt status to a different organization created for
the purpose of “applying for federal and state grants.”55 The IRS informed that organization that
“you are operated primarily for a non-exempt purpose – to apply for and receive federal grant
money for the benefit of LLC, a related for-profit entity.”56 There is no evidence that the IRS has
applied a similar standard to the charity in the New Jersey halfway house case.
This may (or may not) be an extreme example of the downside of charity carveouts and
the use of a charity as a conduit for winning a contract. This example suggests that exempt
status has little if anything to do with effective performance of government contracts.
The relevant question for administrators is whether the exempt entity has the capacity for
monitoring the performance of the subcontractor. It also suggests that charities that are simply
alter egos of the subcontractor are unlikely to have this capacity. Thus, it might be possible to
develop best practices guidelines that would mandate, at the very least, additional scrutiny in
cases of this kind of relationship between the conduit charity and the entity that will perform the
duties specified in the contract. Questions of the capacity for performing these duties and for
monitoring the performance of the entity performing these duties are largely unrelated to tax
status.
In this case, revocation of the exempt status of the conduit charity would seem to be
important as a matter of the integrity of the law of exemption, but would be largely irrelevant to
daily monitoring of contract compliance.

IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The roles played by charities as government contractors offer one perspective on the
larger issue of charities’ relationships with government and with market entities. Exempt entities
are enmeshed in complex relationships with both governments and markets and should be
understood in terms of these relationships. Claims of distinctiveness as a basis for autonomy
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from accountability cannot be reconciled with the multiple relationships through which exempt
entities seek to achieve their exempt purposes.
Looking more closely at exempt entities in the contracting state could result in a number
of benefits to both the exempt entity contractors and to government agencies. The question is
whether it will result in better service to the intended beneficiaries, especially among the most
vulnerable members of our state and national communities. Monitoring and accountability are
important because beneficiaries must be the point of reference. The Supreme Court’s ideological
invocation of federalism in many instances makes the question of whether the federal or state
government is responsible for implementing a program the central question. This is not the core
question of either exempt status or cooperative federalism. The point of accountability under a
properly designed and implemented framework of cooperative federalism is for the government
actors and the contractors that participate in program implementation to share responsibility for
ensuring that taxpayers’ money is used for the designated purposes.
Without meaningful program monitoring, the program beneficiaries may not be properly
served and the taxpayers’ money may not be properly used. Monitoring based on tax status
would not be plausibly considered in the case of taxable contractors, but it is claimed as plausible
or logical in the case of exempt entity contractors. This paper expresses substantial reservations
about the idea that exempt entities bring to government contracting any special virtue that
reduces the need for or appropriateness of government monitoring of their performance and
considerable skepticism about conflating performance monitoring with tax compliance.
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